Revisiting the RPA's Next New York recommendations from 2012: not much improvement for Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park (third party monitor?)

Now that Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park has multiple new owners and leaseholders (FAQ here), and residents are trying to assess the project's progress and future, it's worth revising the May 2012 recommendations from the Regional Plan Association (RPA), in "Building the Next New York: Recommendations for Large Real Estate Projects." (The press release is here, and the report's embedded at bottom.)

As I wrote at the time, "the RPA's recommendations for mega-projects implies avoidance of Atlantic Yards pattern, though the report suggests no verdict yet on project." (Former head Robert Yaro later wrote that the RPA not only saw the Atlantic Yards site as appropriate for a big project, it also recognized it couldn't  fight the mayor.)

The most important recommendation, I think, was for an independent, third-party project monitor for costs and benefits. That, of course, hasn't happened.

The RPA is a business-funded, mainstream group, which opposed the West Side Stadium but generally supports major development while also pushing for more thoughtful planning. Beyond it's general support for Atlantic Yards, it did lament the undemocratic process, suggest transportation improvements, and propose more public oversight.

In 2009, the RPA advised the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which was set to revise its deal with Forest City, to seek more future project revenues, and said the project deserved both a new cost benefit analysis and a new Empire State Development Corporation subsidiary to oversee it.

Those recommendations were ignored at the time, though in 2014, there was some progress on the second issue, as described below--but very limited progress.

The context in 2012

At the time of the recommendations, the Barclays Center was under construction but we were awaiting construction of the first tower, the ill-fated B2 modular building that launched in December 2012. As it turned out, the considerable hype behind modular--said to be the construction technique for the entire project--was deflated after delays and cost overruns.

That was likely one catalyst for original developer Forest City Ratner's decision to sell a considerable chunk of the project--ultimately 70% going forward, excluding the arena operating company and B2--in 2014 to Greenland USA, an arm of the Shanghai-based Greenland Group, owned significantly by the government of Shanghai. Greenland then engineered the project's name change.

In 2018, Greenland bought all but 25% of the project going forward, and then the Greenland-controlled joint venture, still Greenland Forest City Partners, leased four development sites to other developers.

Recommended principles, revisited

As I wrote in 2012, the RPA's recommendations in many ways ran directly counter to the Atlantic Yards pattern. Let's take a look, and evaluate where we are:

• Establish policy goals and measurable benchmarks to maximize and balance economic, social equity and environmental benefits;

Well, the policy goals in the original Community Benefits Agreement were mostly unenforceable, and the goals in the state's Modified General Project Plan, approved in 2006 and re-approved in 2009, were attenuated by contracts that broadly defined affordable housing and gave until 2035 to finish the project.

Since 2012, there was a change: a threatened lawsuit on fair housing grounds catalyzed a 2014 agreement that set a new, 2025 deadline for the affordable housing, but did not set any guidelines on affordability. Thus the range of income-linked housing became skewed toward middle-income households.

• Clarify the maze of state, city and federal requirements early in the process;

I'm not sure if that was ever fully clarified, especially since requirements can be changed, thanks to revision of deals: in 2009, Forest City renegotiated settled agreements with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Empire State Development, giving it more time for the project sponsor to pay for railyard development rights and more time to acquire property, in both cases helping the developer's bottom line.

The deadline for the required new Vanderbilt Yard has stretched several times, but apparently without pushback from the MTA. Perhaps it's because the state's governor, always a support of the project (no matter the office's occupant), controls the MTA. Perhaps it's because the timetable for East Side Access--the service which, once established, will catalyze more frequent shuttle service between Atlantic Terminal and Jamaica, thus using the new railyard more--has continued to be pushed back.

• Obtain public input at the beginning of the planning process to develop greater consensus;

Public input was obtained, as there were public hearings and extensive comments, but its impact on the project was relatively slight. A project as divisive as this might not have developed much more consensus. It's a political process, with the strongest in charge.

But the use of the city's land use review process, known as ULURP, though hardly an example of sterling democracy, might have added legitimacy, since it would've given local elected officials a voice. The state's process overrides local rules and input.

• Lead with public-realm improvements such as parks, streets and plazas to lay the groundwork for private development;

This is the lesson from Battery Park City or even the Domino Sugar project, since, whatever the flaws and dodges in those projects, something visible serving the general public came early. With Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park, the Barclays Center offers an accidental plaza, but it's significantly a private amenity while offering some public-realm improvement.

The much-hyped 8 acres of open space in Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park, might look good on paper, but 1) likely will be used significantly by the residents in the towers bordering it and 2) could take until 2035. 

The design of the project, which relies significantly on the demapping of Pacific Street and decking over the Vanderbilt Yard, means the open space would come slowly and not be finished until the last tower is built. The cost of delay should've been made more clear.

• Connect real estate and transportation improvements;

Well, the developer of the Barclays Center did reopen a significant entry point to the Atlantic Avenue subway station complex, opening to the plaza. That is crucial to arena operations, but also helps the public, as well.

The report at the time warned that Atlantic Yards is among "large projects that have done little to improve the accessibility or capacity of existing transit services," despite being a large auto trip
generator. It's unclear how many auto trips will be generated by the residential buildout.

• Promote long-term revenue sharing among public land owners and private developers;

Long-term revenue sharing--what's that? We've never heard that discussed.

• Implement district-wide sustainability practices such as green infrastructure and renewable energy;

Well, the buildings are supposed to be LEED-certified. There are still questions about the impact of such a large project.

• Maintain continuing public oversight to guide development and maintenance.

Well, the 2014 settlement that led to the new 2025 deadline for affordable housing added the Atlantic Yards Community Development Corporation (AY CDC), an advisory body. While it's added some modest transparency, it's controlled by the governor and been mostly toothless.

Lessons from the past

The document cites lessons from past development, including Atlantic Yards, which I'll update below:

• In most instances, planning, approval and construction generally took far longer than originally envisioned.

That's an argument for more realism, and skepticism, up front.

• High upfront costs and long-term paybacks make public-private development difficult to negotiate, implement and evaluate.

That, perhaps, was not appreciated enough by those (like me) coming to the project anew. It should've been part of the discussion.

• Community and environmental benefits have become increasingly important in public-private negotiations, but are difficult to balance with economic and financial objectives.

True, though that's an argument for a better oversight process.

• Robust public input early in the planning process tends to produce greater political consensus and better outcomes.

Possibly.

• Multiple and overlapping jurisdictions by different city, state and federal agencies can often make for an inconsistent and confusing set of rules governing the development of different projects.

That seems unlikely to change without legislative action.

• Most of these projects attempted to build on their proximity to existing or planned transit services and improved surface vehicular and pedestrian circulation, some more successfully than others.

While the text cited Atlantic Yards as among "large projects that have done little to improve the accessibility or capacity of existing transit services, yet [is a] large auto trip generator," that seems premature, given that there is a new subway entrance and the arena has, at least for basketball games, generated less driving than feared. (Concerts are another story.) Given that the project is far from finished, any assessment is premature.

Recommended reforms, revisited

The 2012 study, as per the press release (which does not entirely track the report!), suggested several reforms, which I'll update below:

• Land use and environmental review procedures should be assessed and overlapping or excessive regulations should be modified. Protections that are too weak need to be strengthened.

Nothing really has changed, given the state process, though the significant pushback against the Amazon campus, which would've been approved under the same state process, suggests there may be a political push for city--or more integrated--oversight. We'll see.

• An independent entity, such as New York City’s Independent Budget Office, should monitor project costs and benefits over time to provide greater transparency.

That's still a good idea--a third-party monitor. As I wrote in 2012, in a sign of how politicized cost-benefit analyses can get, in the case of Atlantic Yards, the city and state disparaged the IBO's analysis while issuing their own, questionable analyses, for example premised on the untenable notion that the project would be built out in full over a decade. That, indeed, turned out to be untenable.

• Value recapture mechanisms such as tax-increment financing, in which the cost of new infrastructure is subsidized by anticipated higher real-estate tax revenue generated by the redevelopment project, and co-development of projects between public and private entities, should be promoted. 

Tax-increment financing is not uncontroversial, and is complicated when there are significant tax-exempt properties. As to co-development,  public sector does not seem to have been robust enough to try it.

That said, one lesson from Atlantic Yards that we should now heed is that government overseers should better assess whether a project is actually viable. That includes the costs of delay and the benefits of a more modest, but more buildable, project.

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