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Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park FAQ, timeline, and infographics (pinned post)

State officials say they expect a new developer to emerge. But without a new plan, will they pursue damages on June 1 for absent affordable housing?

This is the fifth of five articles on the March 25, 2025 meeting of the advisory Atlantic Yards Community Development Corporation (AY CDC), held at the office of its parent Empire State Development (ESD). The first concerned the Pacific Park Conservancy. The second concerned making BSE Global pay for a permanent arena plaza. The third concerned the unusually large plan for Site 5. The fourth concerned the AY CDC budget.

Please see coverage in City Limits, Brooklyn’s Stalled Atlantic Yards Plan Faces More Questions Than Answers, which includes the key information in the article but takes a bigger-picture perspective. This article covers more of the blow-by-blow discussion.

With barely two months to go before $2,000/month damages are triggered for each of 876 missing affordable housing units in Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park, state representatives at the meeting seemed uncertain about whether they'd enforce the penalties or whether a new developer--and renegotiation--would emerge.

A foreclosure auction of developer Greenland USA’s rights to build six towers (B5-B10) over the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s two-block Vanderbilt Yard, first announced on Nov. 15, 2023 for January 2024, has been rescheduled multiple times, given the complications involved.

The owner of the collateral—companies formed with funds from immigrant investors who loaned $349 million (with $286 million left unpaid) to Greenland—can’t exercise it. They need a “permitted developer,” one with at least a decade of experience in large-scale projects, to form a joint venture.

Beyond that, the terms for such a joint venture are uncertain, since the current development plan, as approved in 2006 and 2009, clearly wasn’t economically viable for Greenland.

A new development team would have to pay hundreds of millions of dollars for a platform to protect railyard functions before going vertical.


It also might be liable for the $1.752 million in monthly penalties, at least if those terms aren’t revised by Empire State Development (ESD), the state authority that oversees/shepherds the project.

Last year, a joint venture seemed to progress, steered by the U.S. Immigration Fund (USIF), the company that recruited the immigrant investors under the EB-5 program, which trades visas for purportedly job-creating investments.

That joint venture, involving Hudson Yards developer Related Companies, was said last November by ESD official to be progressing. Related has since left the plan, for reasons not explained.


What's coming

 “We have been told there will be a new developer,” Anna Pycior, ESD Senior VP, Community Relations, told AY CDC directors. “They have not yet been presented to us.”

Given the looming deadline, asked AY CDC Director Gib Veconi “is it all possible to vet a developer and effect a transfer of the railyard rights before the 31st of May?” 

Veconi, who in 2014 helped negotiate the affordable housing deadline as a leader of the coalition BrooklynSpeaks, added, “It seems like that was a shorter interval than was required for Related.”

Joel Kolkmann, Senior VP, Real Estate and Planning, noted that the process should move faster because the USIF has already gone through it. “I think we can theoretically do it if we were to receive something in the near term," he said, "but, as you point out, time is limited.”

Even so, observed Veconi, an incoming developer would probably want to restructure the project’s entitlements—the scope of development and deadlines—which would be difficult.

What happens June 1?

What, Veconi asked, would happen on June 1, when the penalties become due?

Kolkmann referred to a question posed in February by Brooklyn Assemblymember Jo Anne Simon to ESD CEO Hope Knight at a hearing in Albany. Knight’s response, he said, holds true: “absent us receiving a permitted developer package and proposal and a plan prior to that date, we obviously would have to move forward with pursuing liquidated damages.”

(I thought Knight seemed less than enthusiastic.)

Those damages would be pursued against Greenland, which, given the postponements of foreclosure, remains the zombie developer of the railyard sites. 

However, it’s not clear if the Greenland affiliates responsible—which after all haven’t paid off the loans—would have assets for repayment, would seek a delay, or would forfeit the collateral. No Greenland representative attended the meeting.

(Another Greenland affiliate, which owns the rights to development at Site 5, catercorner to the arena, as well as the unbuilt B1, once slated to loom over the arena, does have an asset: a Site 5 development project involving two large towers. While that requires approval by the board of the gubernatorially controlled ESD, the state authority in 2021 signed an interim lease agreeing to support a project of that scope.)

“If we were to receive something in the very near term,” Kolkmann said, ESD would consider a delay on the liquidated damages, “with very clear milestones of what would have to happen in the very near term."

Complications

Veconi raised a chicken-and-egg question: ESD previously had said a new plan couldn't be negotiated with a new developer before a transfer was completed. (A revised plan could include, as Greenland unsuccessfully sought in 2023, extended deadlines and bonuses like additional bulk, while promising additional affordable units.) “Can you explain what you mean by a new plan?”

“Not a fully signed-off plan,” responded Arden Sokolow, Executive VP, Real Estate and Planning, but a permitted developer package, “plus an engagement plan for engaging with stakeholders and contours of what their requests would be.”

(The concept “contours” was not specified. However, it seems doubtful that Related would have lobbied ESD last year for months without discussing, for example, an extended timeline and concessions that would make the finances work.)

Veconi restated that the sequence involves a vetted developer, a transfer of rights, and then the presentation of a plan. Kolkmann agreed, adding that there'd then be “community engagement around that plan leading to an eventual, whole fleshed-out plan and an environmental impact statement.”

(It's hard to imagine that "community engagement" would significantly reshape the plan, given that the numbers must work, but it could help ratify and/or tweak it.)

AY CDC Director Ron Shiffman, a veteran advocacy planner and former City Planning Commissioner, asked if that plan would be limited to the six platform sites or if it would include Site 5. ESD executives said they didn’t know what would be presented.

Potential delays

Veconi returned to the timeline, noting the process of bringing a plan for ESD board approval could take more than a year.

Kolkman said “near term” meant a good-faith effort to proceed. 

AY CDC Chair Daniel Kummer noted another issue: it’s likely that Greenland, if presented with claims for liquidated damages, might claim “unavoidable delay,” a term in the project's master Development Agreement. 

It includes, for example, "governmental action or restriction," which, perhaps, Greenland might invoke regarding previous tense negotiations with both ESD and the MTA.

The requirement for 2,250 units is subject to both "unavoidable delay" as well the Development Agreement's Section 8.6(d)(i)(IV), which allows a developer to claim a lack of affordable housing subsidies.

Veconi, acknowledging he’s not a lawyer, noted that he'd read the document and thought "unavoidable delay" might be difficult to claim. Kummer, a lawyer, said, “We're not the arbiters of that,” but just suggested such claims were likely.

Veconi suggested that a new developer would ask about the penalties and the project’s new deadline. “It doesn't seem like those questions could be held” until the ESD approves a new plan," he said. “Where in this process do you see coming down to brass tacks with a new developer around something like that?” 

Sokolow’s response was fuzzy, citing the community engagement process and “working on the contours of whatever the next phase of this is going to look like.” 

(It’s hard to imagine that a developer would risk community endorsement of a plan’s major contours after agreeing to an investment.) 

“I imagine you're right,” she told Veconi. At some point, the developer would “need to know what that looks like. We haven't fully mapped out yet the exact timeline.”

USIF incentives

Shiffman, citing my coverage, noted that USIF does not have any of its own money in the deal—it’s the manager of the EB-5 funds—so it has no incentive to come forward with a developer.

But there is, suggested Sokolow, because if nothing is presented by May 31, the penalties apply.

But USIF doesn’t have anything to lose, Shiffman reiterated.

“Except the collateral,” Sokolow observed. (It's unclear whether it has any ownership interest in the collateral.)

Veconi pointed out that, as I reported, a USIF affiliate did make the annual $11 million payment to the MTA in 2024 for railyard development rights—even though they don’t control the collateral. (How that was allowed has not been fully explained. My City Limits article also notes the USIF's big deal with the Nassau Coliseum site.)

Who holds the collateral?

It's unclear who owns and controls the collateral now. The EB-5 investor funds, known as AYB Funding 100 and AYB Funding 200, which were provided the railyard sites as collateral, are controlled by the manager, at least according to the initial Private Placement Memorandums.

Late in 2020, the USIF encouraged the EB-5 investors to move their money to another project in Manhattan, known as TSX Broadway. Reciprocally, Fortress Investment Group, a private company that has periodically collaborated with the USIF, was expected to take a majority stake in the AYB funds.

(It’s unclear how much of a stake Fortress made and whether it invested any cash. While the USIF told investors that Fortress would control those funds, it’s unclear if such control would’ve occurred if Fortress didn’t acquire a majority.)

Two tracks

Shiffman said he wanted to know if USIF was “a reliable enough entity to bring forward a new developer” and why ESD isn't looking at alternatives.

Sokolow said they’re pursuing two tracks. One is seeking a viable new plan. The other is collecting damages.

“But what about completing the project?” asked Shiffman.

Kummer suggested the two tracks could intersect: the Greenland entities in foreclosure have the development rights and, if ESD were to pursue the penalties and they don't pay, “that impairs the collateral for this debt, and those entities would be in default.”

As to the USIF-related entities, he observed, “they need to be concerned that their collateral, that they're trying to foreclose on, is not impaired by default in paying those penalties.”

“What do they lose?” interjected Shiffman. “They lose other people's money,” that of the EB-5 investors.

“Well, there’s another entity involved,” Kummer said, apparently referring to Fortress. 

(It might be "worth it" to pay the penalties--just as USIF entities paid the MTA--if it paid off in the end.)

Who are the parties?

Shiffman cited questions submitted before the meeting by local resident Robert Puca—questions based on my coverage—about the role of the USIF. “And I'd like a briefing on that. So we can ascertain that we’re working with an entity that is reliable.”

“But USIF is an entity that ESD approved,” Sokolow said, referring to transactions in 2014 and 2015, long before current ESD executives began working on the project. “We consented to this structure, and they are who we are dealing with.”

Kummer noted Fortress's involvement, and the question of how much debt they now hold. “I don’t think ESD was involved in approving them,” he said, “or were you?

He didn't get a direct answer. “If we're looking forward, anything that we get,” said Kolkmann, “will be reviewed in terms of Fortress’s involvement, USIF’s involvement, their breakdown in the entities, their ownership… What we know now is that Fortress has a percentage of debt with USIF, and that's the extent of what we have.”

ESD takeover?

“If we end up having to pursue damages,” Veconi said, “based on what is sort of understood about Greenland’s current position that, as [Kolkmann] said, would probably bring us to a place where they end up defaulting under the obligations" to the Development Agreement.

“That would give ESD the ability to terminate the development leases, which then give ESD the ability to market those leases to other developers,” he said. That could allow ESD to reduce some of the project risk. (Veconi and others have long warned about the risk of relying on a single developer.)

Shiffman asked, “Is ESD working on that alternative?” 

The answer seemed: not quite.

“Our goal would be to have a community engagement process right now,” said Kolkmann. “We are waiting for a development entity to come forward to be a permitted developer, present a proposal and then do engagement with… those broad contours in mind.”

“That’s where we are right now,” he said. “We have two months until we know whether or not we will be seeking that June 1 payment.”

“To be honest,” Veconi said, “I would kind of more look forward to a scenario where ESD ends up back in control of all the development leases again, forms an LDC [local development corporation], and starts bidding them out for development.”

Shiffman said, “I would prefer looking at how that would function today rather than waiting six or eight months.”

A history of risk

Veconi warned that the idea of modifying the current plan “with another single developer, objectively, just seems like an extraordinary risk at this moment.” 

He cited a series of failures: the pullout of Related, which came after a lack of interest from other developers. That came after Greenland’s default, unable to develop the railyard. And that came after original developer Forest City Ratner sold its interests in the project, going forward, to Greenland.

“So the idea that somebody would appear here now, literally at the eleventh hour, and sort of solve all the problems has a little bit of a Lone Ranger vibe to it,” Veconi said. “It's possible, but it seems extremely unlikely.” 

Affordable value

“I would not feel comfortable forgoing the liquidated damages for an extended period of time on the basis of somebody who appears so late in the process,” he said. “The liquidated damages represent the value of affordable housing that everyone agreed eleven years ago, this project was supposed to provide to people who need it in Brooklyn.”

“I don't think it's morally acceptable for the public to be put out in that way,” he said. 

“The timing is really important right now,” Shiffman said, “because, in reality, no developer is going to be building for a couple years,” so getting the damages is important.

“We would be getting that money at a time when the city is making some fairly significant commitments to affordable housing in the immediate area around the project,” Veconi said, referring to the Atlantic Avenue Mixed-Use Plan (AAMUP), for which he served on the steering committee.

Will anything happen?

“Your two-track hypothesis doesn't preclude proceeding against the incumbent developer full steam ahead,” Kummer said, “while you’re trying to get the lend--" he corrected himself—"the USIF to come forward with a new developer.”

“Once you transfer it, it would,” Veconi said, referring to the foreclosure.

“In a world where we collect the damages,” Sokolow said, “what do you think happens to the sites?... You wouldn't be getting any housing there.”

“You may not get it anyhow,” Shiffman said, suggesting that strictures from Washington limit potential state aid for the project. “Building on those platform sites may now be impractical for the near future.”

The city’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development, suggested Veconi, would be happy to get $1.752 million a month for “preserving and creating affordable housing in neighborhoods that are experiencing some of the highest displacement rates in New York City.”

Questions about the parties

Shiffman asked if there was any reply to the comments posted by Puca, distilled from my coverage, about the roles of Fortress and the USIF, among other things.

Kummer said, “He provided us public service in organizing the questions I think many of us have... and I would request ESD to take those questions under advisement.” He invited ESD staff to share any additional updates and/or offer an update, even in Executive Session, at the next meeting.

“At this time," Pycior said, "the information that we were able to share has been presented."

Kummer noted that questions involved the specific entities for meeting the May 12 deadline for starting the platform and the May 31 deadline for the affordable housing. (Nobody discussed that platform deadline.)

Kolkmann noted that the entities are controlled by Greenland. ESD Attorney Matthew Acocella said there’s “a very confusing kind of structure.”

“They’re in foreclosure, but the foreclosure sales have not been completed,” noted Kummer.

Veconi said, “I'm sure that the folks who entered into those loans and the agents for the lenders understood the collateral they were buying and understood what would happen if they had to collect it, and what obligations they would have to ESD in order to complete the transfer….I have to assume that they took those risks on with their eyes open.”

(That’s probably true for the USIF. For the immigrant investors, that's far more doubtful.)

What's next?

Veconi asked for another meeting to be scheduled. Kummer agreed that, given the factors in play, it would make sense to have a meeting in late April or May. 

As noted in my City Limits article, queries to Greenland USA, the USIF, and Fortress did not get a response. 

I'd note that Greenland, while it still paying its lobbying firm, is no longer being represented by public relations firm BerlinRosen.

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