Flashback 2008, when project was stalled, prescience & myopia from city's Thompson: other developers might join, but a "good idea" can be diminished by delay

In May 2008, when the Atlantic Yards project had been stalled by the recession, the project, as I wrote, was the most contentious element of a panel discussion at the New School’s Center for New York City Affairs titled "Maintaining Momentum: Can New York’s Ambitious Development Agenda Survive an Economic Downturn?"

My headline quoted City Comptroller (and mayoral candidate) William Thompson: "Thompson says other developers might join AY; 'I’m not sure what that project is any longer'."

He was, if unwittedly, prescient, as other developers did join, notably Greenland USA, in 2014 buying a majority stake in the project, 70% going forward (excluding the B2 tower, 461 Dean, and the arena company), and, after building four towers with original developer Forest City Ratner/Forest City New York, in 2018 taking all but 5% of the remaining project.

Greenland Forest City Partners then sold development rights to the B12/B13 sites (595 Dean) to TF Cornerstone. It sold rights to the B15 site (662 Pacific, aka Plank Road) to The Brodsky Organization and partnered with Brodsky--though the latter handles marketing--on B4 (18 Sixth, aka Brooklyn Crossing).

Though nearly half of the approved 6,430 apartments will have been completed by mid-year, the plan to deck the Vanderbilt Yard, which would deliver six towers and create the majority of the promised open space, has not moved forward. 

So the project is at a crossroads, with plans for that crucial platform on hold, despite Greenland USA's statement, in late 2019, that the first phase--one of two blocks--would start in 2020.

That leaves huge question marks about the completion of Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park, compounded by rising interest rates, the absence of the 421-a tax break, and the developer's financial struggles. 

Meanwhile, Greenland is presumably aiming effort to avoid $2,000/month fines for the 876 (or 877) affordable apartments that won't be delivered by May 2025, part of an obligation to build 2,250 such units.

The cost of delay

In retrospect, the flaws in Thompson's overall support for the project seem more glaring, given his statement about the timeline: "it was a good idea two years ago, it will be a good idea in five years and in ten years."

Now, it's been nearly 15 years since then--and nearly 19.5 years since the project was announced--and the project still isn't half-finished. Also, Site 5, catercorner to the arena block, is in limbo, despite plans floated in 2016 for a giant, two-tower project. 

There has to be a cost to delay, not just to the developers--failing to reap revenue from their investments--but also to the public, which offered direct and indirect financial and other assistance, purportedly justified by the delivery of public benefits.

Thompson’s AY defense

The recession, Thompson suggested, " challenges the way we look at projects and look at megaprojects... We need to start to look at them in stages. And if a project makes sense in 2007, it probably makes sense five years and ten years later.”

“So I wouldn’t say that it is full speed ahead.,” he said, but suggested that government contribute infrastructure "through up and down cycles." The problem, in retrospect, is that the public was relying on the developer for that key infrastructure.

“It may be a slightly different project," he continued, "and we may need to bring additional developers--and that’s one of the things I think you’ll see also, it’s no longer relying on one developer on megaprojects, you will look at multiple developers in different stages, so it all doesn’t fall on one person’s shoulders.”

Querying Thompson

I caught up with Thompson after that event. Given that the project was approved under the assumption that the benefits would arrive in ten years, rather than two or three decades, I asked whether he thought it deserved a new review, as some in Brooklyn contend.

“The first thing, we’d like to define it and fully understand it,” he replied. “What is the project going to be over the next two, three, five, ten years? I think that’s the course that we’d like to do. People would like to go back and re-trigger things and look at it again--I don’t know that we should do that.”

So what’s the process to define it, I asked.

“Government has an obligation,” he said, “to fully make sure” what the short- and long-term goals of the project are and make them public.

The need for a monitor

Today, that resonates even more. The 2014 agreement that established the new 2025 deadline for affordable housing included the establishment of the Atlantic Yards Community Development Corporation (AY CDC), supposed to monitor the project and make recommendations to the parent Empire State Development Corporation, today Empire State Development (ESD).

The AY CDC, dominated by less-than-informed gubernatorial appointments, has mostly been a lapdog, though it's occasionally elicited some information about the project.

But the AY CDC, which is supposed to meet quarterly, hasn't met since last June, having missed three expected meeting slots.

It would be a natural forum to learn about whether ESD will hold the developer to the affordable housing obligation and, if it's being lobbied not to do so, what the arguments, and responses, are.